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Michael Maselli 
Law and Sexuality 
The Validity of Laws Prohibiting the Sale of Sex Toys 
May 7, 2010 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 The use of sexual devices has been a source of contention in the United States for nearly 
a century. Religious fundamentalists believe that the use of such devices is morally 
reprehensible. A significant part of the county subscribes to traditional Christian ideals that 
promote sex between a man and a woman for the purpose of procreation, any manipulation is 
often met with resistance. Before Lawrence, and a couple other relevant landmark cases, it was 
much easier for this group to impose its will on the general public through anti-obscenity 
statutes. After Lawrence, I argue that a right to sexual privacy was established that substantially 
limited a legislature's ability to encroach on an individual's bedroom behavior. Lawrence is to be 
interpreted as the law may not criminalize sexual behavior of any individual in the privacy of his 
home. Thus, the right to sexual privacy must extend to one's use of sex toys. Nevertheless, in 
light of Lawrence, a few states have still enacted anti-obscenity statutes that infringe on one's 
right to use sex toys. While it is hard to imagine a statute standing up to constitutional scrutiny 
involving the private use of sex toys, the outcome is far less clear regarding laws prohibiting the 
sale of sex toys. In order to uphold such statutes, states have set forth several arguments 
regarding the sale of these devices. In these instances, states argue that the statutes should be 
upheld based on a public morality position. Essentially, a government determines that certain 
values should be preserved through laws that can limit what is perceived to be generally 
unacceptable behavior. More effective though has been an argument grounded on the “secondary 
effects doctrine” that has allowed states to effectively ban the sale of sex toys through zoning 
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laws. Under this rationale, a government may contend that the operation of certain businesses 
can lead to an offshoot of negative effects that harm the surrounding areas. Thus, it is asserted 
that the government has a legitimate interest in combating these effects through legislation. My 
paper will first examine Lawrence to argue that it established a right to sexual privacy that 
encompasses the use of sex toys. In doing so, I will examine the split between the 5
th
 Circuit and 
the 11
th
 Circuit. Additionally, I will address the public morality argument in favor of anti-
obscenity statute, pointing out its failures. Lastly, the paper aims to highlight how states do not 
need to explicitly ban the sale of sex toys because the secondary effects doctrine and zoning laws 
accomplish the same goal. 
 
II. Lawrence as a Starting Point. 
  
Any discussion of anti-obscenity statutes and their relation to the use and sale of sex toys 
starts with an analysis of Lawrence.
1
 The case involved a state statute that effectively prohibited 
sexual conduct between homosexual men by criminalizing certain sexual conduct between two 
individuals of the same sex.
2
 Two men were charged with violating the statute.
3
 They challenged 
the constitutionality of the statute and lost at the state and appellate level.
4
 The Supreme Court 
eventually overturned the appellate division.
5
 
 The opinion in Lawrence enumerated a few key points that support the idea that one 
possesses a right to sexual privacy. The court concluded that engaging in same sex intercourse is 
                                                 
1
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
2
 Id. at 562. 
3
 Id. at 563. 
4
 Id. 
5
 Id. at 564. 
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an exercise of a personal liberty guaranteed by the constitution.
6
 Additionally, the court stated 
that moral disapproval cannot be viewed as a legitimate state interest for rational basis purposes.
7
 
The court held that the statue unfairly attacks same sex couples.
8
 One must assume that same sex 
male couples engage in some form of sexual intercourse that is deemed sodomy under the 
statute. Furthermore, the court held that the presumption of criminal behavior of all same sex 
couples greatly ostracizes them.
9
 
 
A. An Intermediate Level of Review. 
 
To make any sense of this issue, it is imperative to understand the standard of review 
employed by the court in Lawrence to establish a right to sexual privacy. Previously, courts either 
applied strict scrutiny or a rational basis review to address challenged state statutes. Strict 
scrutiny requires that the law be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
10
 
Under this high level of review, the usual presumption of constitutionally is lost and the 
government is provided little leeway to construct a statute that reaches beyond its stated 
purpose.
11
 Conversely, a rationale basis review requires that the challenging party prove that the 
stated government interest is not rationally related to the relevant law.
12
 In this case, there is a 
high presumption of constitutionality and provides governments with incredible flexibility.
13
 
Finding these two standards difficult to work with in certain contexts, the Supreme Court 
                                                 
6
 Id. at 578. 
7
 Id. at 577-78. 
8
 Id. 
9
 Id. at 575. 
10
 Jennifer L. Greenblatt, Putting the Government to the (Heightened, Intermediate, or Strict) Scrutiny Test: 
Disparate Application Shows Not All Rights and Powers are Created Equal, 10 Fl. Coastal L. Rev. 421, 434 (2009). 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. at 436. 
13
 Id. 
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developed a third standard of review that falls somewhere in between the two aforementioned 
standards.  
Often referred to as intermediate scrutiny, the standard requires that the law exhibit a 
substantial relation to an important government interest.
14
 In one of the clearest expressions of 
this hybrid test, the court in Craig v. Boren invalidated a statute that prohibited the sale of beer 
with a certain level of alcohol content to males under the age of 21 and females under the age of 
18.
15
 The government interest to be furthered by the law was public protection on the roadways 
as the government believed that statistics showed males were more likely to cause traffic 
accidents associated with alcohol use.
16
 In analyzing the constitutionality of the law, the court 
merely stated that classifications that distinguish males and females are subject to “scrutiny,” 
without committing to strict scrutiny.
17
 The court then explained this modified standard citing 
precedent and stated that, “classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”18 A version of 
the intermediate scrutiny standard was applied in Lawrence as well. 
Whereas the court Boren was far more deliberate in its articulation of a hybrid level of 
scrutiny, the standard of review used by the Lawrence court is far more unclear. The court held 
that the challenged statute, “furthered no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion 
into the personal and private life of an individual.”19 Immediately preceding this statement 
though, the court went on to provide a list of conduct that the court seems to imply would justify 
an intrusion of personal liberty.
20
 Thus, the court did not necessarily deem such an intrusion 
                                                 
14
 Id. at 435. 
15
 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192-193 (1976). 
16
 Id, at 200-201. 
17
 Id. at 197. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
20
 Id.  
6 
 
completely off-limits. Instead the court attacked the importance of the state interest in relation to 
the significance of the government’s intrusion. By using an intermediate scrutiny standard, the 
court utilized a balancing approach that weighed the reasonableness of the state interests against 
the individual right that is sought to be protected. As a result, the court established a right to 
sexual privacy that does not require the strict scrutiny standard of review that attaches to matters 
of enumerated, fundamental rights.  
 
B. How Lawrence Carves Out a Right to Sexual Privacy. 
 
Whether done purposefully or not, the court is quite vague on the extent that its opinion 
should extend to other issues pertaining to sexual behavior. As a result, litigators either argue for 
a broad or narrow interpretation of the opinion depending upon their vantage point.
21
 Under a 
narrow view, the argument follows that Lawrence addressed a limited factual scenario that 
involved same-sexual sexual intercourse.
22
 Proponents of this view contend that had Lawrence 
meant to encompass a larger right, the court would have employed a Glucksberg analysis.
23
  The 
analysis used in Glucksberg to identify a right or liberty that falls within the protection of 
substantive due process requires a court to consider two factors; (1) whether the alleged right is 
deeply rooted in the tradition and history of the nation, and (2) a careful description of the 
asserted fundamental right.
24
 In Glucksberg, the court narrowly defined the asserted right as one 
allowing an individual to assist another in committing suicide, differentiating it from what some 
                                                 
21
 Laura M. Clark, Comment, Should Texas’s Former Ban on Obscene-Device Promotion Pass Constitutional Muster 
Under a Murky Lawrence?, 41 ST. MARY’S L. J. 177, 183 (2009). 
22
 Id. at 179. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Washington. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). 
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asserted was a "right to die.
25
 The court noted a history of statutes banning assisted suicides and 
concluded that, as a result, there is not a fundamental right to assist someone who wishes to kill 
himself.
26
 The Glucksberg court set forth a clear test for evaluating whether the issue is one 
regarding a fundamental right, and in the absence of such analysis, it can be argued that clearly 
the court is not dealing with a fundamental right. The result is that the statute needs only to be 
rationally related to the state interest.
27
  
Conversely, a broad interpretation of the statute proposes that the opinion has further-
reaching implications. Proponents of this view contend that the court established a right to sexual 
privacy that largely protects an individual’s actions within the confines of his bedroom.28 Under 
this view, the interpretation of the statute is not whether two men possess a fundamental right to 
engage in sexual intercourse with each other but instead whether two individuals are free to 
behave as they please in the privacy of their bedroom. I argue that the latter interpretation is 
correct and that one is afforded the right to use sex toys in private. 
In its rejection of the Texas statute prohibiting sodomy, the court focused specifically on the 
idea of liberty. The court viewed an impediment to one’s right to engage in private, intimate 
behavior as an infringement on that individual’s personal liberty.29 The court concluded that 
Texas had not communicated a legitimate state interest that warranted limiting one’s liberty in 
the proposed capacity.
30
 The court noted that the state’s insistence that it had an obligation to 
uphold a certain level of public morality failed on several levels. For one, there was a growing 
sentiment in the United States that citizens should be afforded a significant level of privacy 
                                                 
25
 Id. at 723 
26
 Id. at 728. 
27
 Id.  
28
 Clark, supra note 21, at 199-200. 
29
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
30
 Id. 
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concerning bedroom behavior.
31
 Additionally, the argument that a right to sexual privacy was 
created is embedded in the majority’s discussion as to the behavior at stake. The court rejected 
the notion that the liberty at issue was simply the right for homosexuals to engage in sodomy in 
the privacy of their bedrooms.
32
 While the fact pattern concerned simply that, the contended right 
was something more. Justice Kennedy argued that the relevant right at issue was one’s ability to 
engage in private sexual conduct without the government intrusion.
33
 In doing so, the majority 
quickly dismissed any notion that there is a clear line of history and tradition that bans such 
conduct.  
Past cases have furthered the notion that individuals have a right to be left alone within the 
confines of their bedrooms. In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court held a Georgia statute to be 
unconstitutional that made it illegal to possess obscene materials.
34
 Acting on a search warrant, 
police arrived at a Georgia man’s home and confiscated film that they deemed to be obscene.35 
The man was then convicted under the statute.
36
 In its opinion, the court stated that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments made it constitutionally impermissible to make illegal possession of 
obscene materials.
37
  The court succinctly concluded that the Constitution protects ones right to 
possess information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, and that government action 
contrary to that ideal was an unwarranted intrusion of an individual’s privacy.38   
A second case, while a state Supreme Court decision, reinforced the notion of privacy rights 
and was followed by a series of decisions in other jurisdictions in accordance with this rationale. 
In Commonwealth v. Wasson, the Court struck down a statute that made consensual sodomy 
                                                 
31
 Id. at 576. 
32
 Id. at 578. 
33
 Id. at 577-78. 
34
 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
35
 Id. at 558. 
36
 Id. at 559. 
37
 Id. at 568. 
38
 Id. at 565. 
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between homosexual partners illegal.
39
 In an undercover operation initiated by state police, 
undercover agents solicited sex from men, including Jeffery Wasson.
40
 Eventually, investigators 
were able to get Mr. Wasson to incriminate himself after he suggested engaging in certain sexual 
acts that violated the Kentucky sodomy statute.
41
 He challenged his eventual conviction on the 
grounds that it was unconstitutional because the law violated his privacy rights.
42
 In invalidating 
the statute, the Court noted that the state had a history or discouraging government intrusion in 
similar attacks on privacy rights. 
43
 The decision in Lawrence, coupled with previous federal and 
state court precedent makes it clear that the government has no place in our bedrooms. 
 
C. The Right to Privacy Extends to the Use of Sex Toys. 
 
While the court declined to consider how its decision affects future sexual conduct issues, it 
did carve out a right to engage in private and intimate behavior. Furthermore, the court made it 
clear that such a right cannot be infringed upon on the basis of public morality. An individual 
who uses a device for sexual stimulation in private is equally expressing the liberty the court 
protected in Lawrence. The similarities make any other conclusion irrational. Both forms of 
sexual behavior are performed in private. Additionally, the two examples are of acts that fall 
outside of the traditional view of sexual intercourse for the purpose of procreation. Moreover, 
neither private homosexual conduct, nor private sex toy use harms third parties. Lastly, there is 
no aspect of sex toy use that makes it nonconsensual. Thus, it clearly cannot be stated that private 
possession and use of sex toys falls outside of the scope of sexual privacy established in 
                                                 
39
 Commonwealth v. Wasson. 842 S.W.2d 487, 502 (Ky. 1992). 
40
 Id. at 489. 
41
 Id. 
42
 Id. at 488. 
43
 Id. at 497. 
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Lawrence. As a result, the primary manner to ban the use of sex toys is to block their sale. 
Accordingly, the relevant discussion turns to whether anti-obscenity statutes that prohibit the sale 
of sex toys should be constitutionally invalidated after Lawrence. 
 
II. Legislators Get Creative to Block the Use of Sex Toys. 
 
In accordance with the rationale mentioned above, no state possesses legislation that bans 
the possession or use of sex toys in private.
44
 Additionally, only three states enacted a law that 
limits the sale of these devices.
45
 Consequently, it is clear that the discussion is squarely centers 
on whether a state may constitutionally create such a barrier to a sex toy. 
In all three cases, the sale of sex toys is banned under state anti-obscenity statutes. 
Alabama
46
, Mississippi
47
 and Virginia
48
 have all established devices used for sexual 
enhancement as obscene. The obvious result is that it makes the use of such devices nearly 
                                                 
44
 William Charles Hayes, Rabbit Hunting in the Supreme Court: The Constitutionality of State Prohibitions of Sex 
Toy Sales Following Lawrence v. Texas, 44 GA. L. REV. 245, 252 (2009). 
45
 Id. 
46
 CODE OF ALA. § 13A-12-200.2 (2010) states: 
 It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly distribute, possess with intent to distribute, or offer or 
agree to distribute any obscene material or any device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the 
stimulation of human genital organs for any thing of pecuniary value. Material not otherwise obscene may 
be obscene under this section if the distribution of the material, the offer to do so, or the possession with the 
intent to do so is a commercial exploitation of erotica solely for the sake of prurient appeal. 
47
 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-105 (2010) states:  
A person commits the offense of distributing unlawful sexual devices when he knowingly sells, advertises, 
publishes or exhibits to any person any three-dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily 
for the stimulation of human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses such devices with the intent to 
do so. A person commits the offense of wholesale distributing unlawful sexual devices when he distributes 
for the purpose of resale any three-dimensional device designed or marketed as useful primarily for the 
stimulation of human genital organs, or offers to do so, or possesses such devices with the intent to do so. 
48
 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374  (2010) states:  
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to (1) Prepare any obscene item for the purposes of sale or 
distribution; or (2) Print, copy, manufacture, produce, or reproduce any obscene item for purposes of sale or 
distribution; or (3) Publish, sell, rent, lend, transport in intrastate commerce, or distribute or exhibit any 
obscene item, or offer to do any of these things; or (4) Have in his possession with intent to sell, rent, lend, 
transport, or distribute any obscene item. Possession in public or in a public place of any obscene item as 
defined in this article shall be deemed prima facie evidence of a violation of this section. 
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impossible without actually making it illegal to possess sex toys. In the context of Lawrence, the 
issue is whether barring the sale of sex toys infringes upon one’s liberty without satisfying the 
requirement of meeting a legitimate state interest. Two recent cases in the United State Court of 
Appeals have considered the constitutionality of this legislation and have come to conflicting 
conclusions. 
 
A. A Battle of Interpretation: The 5th Circuit v. The 11th Circuit. 
 
The split between the 5
th
 and 11
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals marks two different 
interpretations of the Lawrence decision and its application to anti-obscenity statutes that block 
the sale of sex toys. Moreover, the split highlights the likelihood that Lawrence will be applied 
inconsistently because of its vague language. Since only a handful of states possess statutes 
relevant to this discussion, and very few courts have addressed their constitutionality, it is 
imperative to consider these two cases before moving forward. 
In 2008, the 5
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals considered the sale of sex toys in Reliable 
Consultants, Inc v. Earle. Addresses a Texas statute that makes it a crime to promote or sell sex 
toys.
49
 The statute in this case banned public and commercial things, unlike the private, non-
commercial aspect of Lawrence.
50
 The court found that the right to engage in private intimate 
conduct outweighed a public morality argument.
51
 It should be noted that one provision of the 
statute made it illegal to lend a sexual device to another person.
52
 Justice Reavley found that 
                                                 
49
 Reliable Consultants, Inc v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 740 (5
th
 Cir. 2008). 
50
 Id. at 741. 
51
 Id. at 746. 
52
 Id. at 741. 
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Lawrence had indeed established that a right to sexual privacy exists.
53
 He further found that the 
use of sex toys falls within the scope of a right to sexual privacy.
54
 Therefore, it was his position 
that it is now the job of the courts to simply uphold this right.
55
 The argument for upholding the 
ban on sex toys was a public morality argument, and Justice Reavley felt that justification was 
not enough to permit the government to infringe to one’s right to sexual privacy.56 Justice 
Reavley appears to acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Lawrence does not use strict scrutiny 
or rational basis analysis, but instead some sort of hybrid. 
Conversely a case before the 11
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals yielded a different opinion on 
a related matter. In Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., Alabama's Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act 
was challenged as a violation of due process.
57
 The law prohibited the sale of sex toys in the 
state.
58
 In the case, the idea of a fundamental right to sexual privacy was explored. It also 
addressed Lawrence and the subsequent reach of privacy protections. Justice Birch upheld the 
ban on the sale of sex toys based on a few justifications. First, Justice Birch argued that 
Lawrence did not create a fundamental right to sexual privacy.
59
 Had a fundamental right been 
created, Justice Birch argued that a Glucksberg analysis would have had to occurred (was the 
right deeply rooted in the nation’s history and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty).60  Birch 
limited the right (sale of sex toys) and clearly found it failed the Glucksberg test, thus a 
fundamental right had not been established.
61
 Without a fundamental right of sexual privacy, 
                                                 
53
 Id. at 744. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. at 746. 
57
 Williams v. Att’y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004). 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. at 1238. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Id. 
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Justice Birch concluded that the rational basis test must have been used in Lawrence.
62
 He then 
stated that the facts in this case are distinguishable from Lawrence, thus even if public morality 
was removed as a justification, the Lawrence decision did not apply in this case because this case 
involved something beyond the “private, consensual and non-commercial “ conduct in 
Lawrence.
63
 The ban here involves public and commercial things. 
 
III. The Government Believes Banning Sex Toys is Necessary to Protect the Moral Fiber     
of Its People 
 
A common justification for prohibiting the sale of sex toys is founded on the notion of 
public morality. Laws based on a public morality argument generally involve conduct that cuts 
against the values society wishes to maintain. 
64
 Included under the umbrella of laws of public 
morality are laws against polygamy, incest, public nudity, and in some states, laws against the 
sale of sex toys. After Lawrence, it is clear that public morality cannot be used as valid 
justification to uphold statutes that ban sexual behavior. 
The attorneys representing both Alabama and Texas in the recent sex toy cases made the 
argument that Lawrence still permitted states to enact legislation for the purpose of protected 
public morality. In Williams, the Alabama Attorney General (“Alabama AG”) argued that 
Lawrence did not extend to commercial regulation of obscene products.
65
 In doing so, counsel 
                                                 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Christopher Wolfe, Forum on Public Morality: Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. 
JURIS. 65 (2000). In this article, the author distinguishes public morality laws from the morality implicitly 
associated with heinous crimes such as murder and from basic laws that protect citizens from their government such 
as laws against bribery and extortion. 
65
 Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, 2005 WL 154044 (U.S., Jan. 20, 2005) Williams v. Attorney General of 
Alabama. 
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likened the ban on the sale of sex toys to a ban on prostitution.
66
 The Alabama AG argued, “this 
court has long upheld restrictions on the commercial trafficking of obscenity not withstanding its 
recognition of the right to possess obscene materials in the privacy of one’s home.”67 This 
proposition of course hinges on the argument that stopping the sale of sex toys somehow is not 
an invasion of one’s private sexual choice. The Texas Attorney General (“Texas AG”) reiterated 
many of the same claims mentioned above. Like the Alabama AG, the Texas AG shaped the issue 
as one regarding the sale of sex.
68
 The Consequently, the Texas AG also argued that allowing the 
sale of sex toys opens the door to invalidated similar public morals legislation like laws against 
prostitution.
69
 The argument again denied that the statute effectively prohibited one’s ability to 
use sex toys referring to the fact that the statute did not contain language of the sort.
70
 While 
public morality may be rationally related to certain public state interests, the right at stake with 
sex toy issues is one of a private matter. Both the Alabama AG and Texas AG mischaracterized 
the issue.  
To understand why the sale of sex toys is protected by Lawrence, it is important to clarify 
the specific right that the relevant anti-obscenity statutes infringe upon. Barring the sale of sex 
toys produces the obvious result that individuals cannot purchase sex toys. Without the ability to 
purchase sex toys, that individual has been prohibited from engaging in private sexual conduct. 
The sale of sex toys does not result in the use of sex toys in public. The sale of sex toys is 
different from the sale of sex (i.e. prostitution) because sex toys involve either personal use, or 
                                                 
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
68
 Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott's Appellee's Brief, 2007 WL 6048303 (C.A.5, Jan. 25, 2007) RELIABLE 
CONSULTANTS INC., Doing Business As Dreamers and Le Rouge Boutique, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEXAS 
ATTORNEY GENERAL GREG ABBOTT 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. 
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use with a consenting partner. Consequently, sex toys involve private, intimate sexual conduct 
that is protected under Lawrence against public morality justifications. 
Whereas certain aspects of Lawrence appear vague, what is clear is that a government 
may not infringe upon one’s right to private sexual conduct on public morality grounds. The 
court in Lawrence was clear when it stated:  
 
“In his dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens concluded that  
the fact a State’s governing majority has traditionally viewed a  
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding  
a law prohibiting the practice, and individual decisions concerning  
the intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to  
produce offspring, are a form of “liberty” protected by due process.  
That analysis should have controlled Bowers, and it controls here.
71
 
 
Again, one’s use of sex toys is private sexual conduct, and while they may be morally 
reprehensible to some in government, precedent is clear that government’s moral values may not 
impede one’s expression of personal liberty. The court did set forth certain instances where 
public morality arguments could withstand constitutional review though. The court specifically 
mentioned laws pertaining to minors, people who can be easily coerced, people who may not 
easily refuse consent, public conduct, or prostitution as potentially valid.
72
 Prohibiting the sale of 
sex toys does not further the deterrence of any of these concerns.
73
 Accordingly, the 11th Circuit 
Court of Appeals erroneously upheld a statute based on morals legislation. Even eliminating 
public morality as a legitimate state interest warranting infringement on this type of liberty, 
                                                 
71
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003). 
72
 Id. at 578. 
73
 Reliable Consultants, Inc v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 746 (5
th
 Cir. Tex. 2008). The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 
eloquently reiterated this point arguing the following: The state here wants to use its laws to enforce a public moral 
code by restricting private intimate conduct,' the appeals judges wrote. 'The case is not about public sex. It is not 
about controlling commerce in sex. It is about controlling what people do in the privacy of their own homes because 
the state is morally opposed to a certain type of consensual private intimate conduct. This is an insufficient 
justification after Lawrence. 
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governments possess an alternative strategy that can have the comparable effect of furthering 
morals legislation without specifically banning certain conduct. 
 
IV. Secondary Effects Doctrine and Sex Toys. 
 
States have additional methods to block the sale of sex toys without specifically 
prohibiting their possession, sale or use. While only a few states actually have legislation to 
make the sale of a sexual enhancement device illegal, many have utilized a twist on the public 
morality argument to maintain a level of separation between the consumer of sex toys and the 
vendors. Known as the secondary effects doctrine, municipalities have justified crippling 
limitations on stores adult businesses (mostly adult entertainment) on the basis that these 
establishments allegedly create adverse effects that are not in the interest of the public. The most 
notable secondary effects are increases in crime, decreases in property values, and other 
consequences that adversely impact neighborhoods.
74
 The secondary effects doctrine is justified 
based on the rationale that governments have a substantial interest in ensuring its establishments 
do not create negative secondary effects as a consequence of their existence.
75
 A government can 
argue that a law is necessary to protect the public against such effects, providing it a substantial 
amount a power to limit the operations of certain businesses.  
As a result of secondary effects legislation, the true intentions of the government are 
inevitably called into question. On the basis of alleged negative consequences that accompany 
certain establishments, a government can impose its view of morality and regulate the sale of 
                                                 
74
 Daniel Linz, Bryant Paul and Bradley J. Shafer, Government Regulation of “Adult” Businesses Through Zoning 
and Anti-Nudity Ordinances: Debunking the Legal Myth of Negative Secondary Effects, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 355, 
356 (2001). 
75
 Id. 
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certain items that are otherwise legal. Of course, a law cannot withstand judicial scrutiny without 
some basis for contending that an adult business is causing negative secondary effects.
76
 Thus, 
studies and statistics are often presented by a government to solidify their stance.
77
    
City regulations that prohibit the sale of adult products can be challenged as a violation of 
expressive conduct under First Amendment protections. While the First Amendment creates a 
right to free speech, it is important to understand that speech encompasses something greater 
than verbal communication. A right to free speech includes a freedom of expression.
78
 For the 
purposes of this paper, the speech I argue is suppressed through anti-obscenity statutes that bar 
the sale of sex toys is the freedom of sexual expression. 
The Supreme Court established a test in 1968 to evaluate prohibitions on expressive 
conduct. In United States v. O’Brien, the court upheld a law prohibiting destruction of draft 
cards.
79
 The case involved an individual who burned his draft card at a Boston courthouse.
80
 The 
man contended that his actions were an expression of his opposition to the Vietnam War.
81
 He 
argued that by prohibiting the destruction of his draft card, the government was infringing on his 
First Amendment freedom of speech.
82
 Conversely, the government argued that the law was 
necessary to further its vital interest in creating an effective system for enlisting citizens in the 
armed services during a time of war.
83
 In upholding the law, the court set forth a four-part test to 
evaluate whether a regulation unlawfully impedes on a First Amendment freedom. The 
regulation is valid if: (1) it is within the constitutional power of the government, (2) it furthers a 
                                                 
76
 Id. at 360. 
77
 Id.  
78
 Hudson, David L. Adult Entertainment and the Secondary Effects Doctine: How a Zoning Regulation May Affect 
First Amendment Freedoms. First Reports. Vol. 2, No. 1. (May 2002). 
79
 United States v. O’Brien. 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968). 
80
 Id. at 369. 
81
 Id. at 375. 
82
 Id. 
83
 Id. at 377-78. 
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substantial government interest, (3) if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression, and (4) if the incidental restriction on the alleged freedoms is not greater than is 
essential in furtherance of that interest.
84
 In resulting cases involving adult businesses, 
governments have successfully argued that suppressing adverse secondary effects that allegedly 
accompany adult businesses is a sufficient government interest to justify some level of 
infringement on one’s freedom of expression. 
The secondary effects doctrine dates back to 1976, in a case decided before the Supreme 
Court. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the court upheld Detroit Ordinances that placed 
burdensome restrictions on where adult businesses could be located within the city.
85
 The case 
involved a theater that showed pornographic movies at two locations in Detroit.
86
 In 1972, the 
city enacted two ordinances, one of which stated that such a theater could not be located within 
500 feet of a residential area.
87
 The result was that the theaters were forced to less populated and 
accessible areas of the city, harming the economic viability of the business. The court ultimately 
opined that the ordinances did not violate the First Amendment because it did not prohibit 
showing adult films; it simply dictated where the films could be shown.
88
 The city’s interest in 
regulating the use of property is adequate to support such restraints.
89
 From a footnote from 
Justice Stevens in this decision, the secondary effects doctrine was born. He stated: 
“The Common Council’s determination was that a concentration of  
adult movie theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a focus  
of crime, effects which are not attributable to theaters showing other  
types of films. It is this secondary effect which these zoning ordinances  
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attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of ‘offensive speech.”90 
 
Moreover, from Justice Powell’s concurrence it can be inferred that the court believed 
that the ordinances fulfilled the second prong of the O’Brien test because their purpose was to 
curb any deterioration of the city’s neighborhoods.91 As a result, municipalities that truly 
believed that these businesses created adverse secondary effects were now armed with judicial 
precedent to combat the alleged issue through zoning restrictions. Not coincidentally, 
municipalities that were in favor of pushing certain moral values were also armed with a new 
tool to limit the sale of adult products like sex toys. 
10 years following the decision in Young, a second case was before the Supreme Court 
dealing with the issue of zoning restrictions for adult businesses. In Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
the court again upheld the constitutionality of zoning ordinances that negatively impacted the 
business of theatres playing adult movies.
92
 In this instance, the court considered the legality of a 
law that made it impermissible for an adult business to operate within 1,000 feet of a residential 
area, church, park or school.
93
 Again, the court determined that the ordinances were not enacted 
to regulate the content of the movies but instead, “the secondary effects of such theaters on the 
surrounding community.”94 The court further concluded that sustaining a certain quality of life 
was a legitimate interest to protect.
95
 
In 2002, the Supreme Court again considered a secondary effects case, this time relating 
to a statute harmful to adult bookstores. Based on a study dating back to 1977 that linked higher 
crime rates to areas containing adult entertainment establishments, the city of Las Angeles 
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enacted a statute that both prohibited adult businesses from being located within 1000 feet of 
each other and prohibited adult businesses from operating out of the same building.
96
 As a result, 
two adult book stores sued the city, alleging that the new statute violated their rights under the 
First Amendment.
97
 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals invalidated the statute, but 
on different grounds.
98
 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals invalidated the statute because the 1977 
study did not present reliable evidence by which the government could reasonably rely on to 
show that the statute served the stated government interest.
99
 In reversing the lower court 
decision, the Supreme Court determined not only that the study convincingly demonstrated a 
correlation between high crime rates and adult businesses but that the city could reasonably rely 
on the study to further its interest to curb criminal behavior.
100
 The court reiterated its holding in 
Renton that a government may rely on evidence that it believes is reasonably relevant to 
demonstrating a connection between speech and an independent government interest.
101
 
Obviously, such a low requirement imposes a minimal burden on the city to justify its actions. 
The court restated that the burden initially rests with the plaintiffs to cast doubt on the rationale 
of the government either by establishing that the evidence presented by the city does not further 
the intended government interest, or by offering evidence of its own.
102
 Only when the plaintiffs 
cast doubt on the rationale does the burden shift to defendants.
103
 Here, plaintiffs did neither in 
the eyes of the court and the statute was upheld. 
While the Young, Renton and Alameda Books decisions suggest that adult businesses that 
sell sex toys can be easily restricted by zoning laws, a few recent decisions have opened the door 
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for challenges to the secondary effects doctrine. In 2000, the Supreme Court took on another 
adult business case, this time concerning a law that made nude dancing illegal in a Pennsylvania 
city.
104
 The law prohibited dancing completely nude and required that all individuals in public 
wear a minimum amount of clothing.
105
 In City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., the Court again upheld the 
law.
106
 Justice O’Conner found that the ordinance only created a minor impediment to one’s 
freedom of expression and was justified in light of the furtherance of a legitimate public interest 
(combating secondary effects related to these establishments).
107
 The decision was not all bad for 
adult businesses though as the court stated that the business “had ample opportunity to contest 
the council’s findings about secondary effects before the council itself, throughout the state 
proceedings, and before this Court.”108 The decision left the door open to potential challenges 
regarding the sufficiency of secondary effects evidence. 
The 11
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals considered a ban on the sale of alcohol at adult 
businesses on the basis that the combination creates harmful secondary effects. In Flanigan’s 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Fulton County, the court called into question the validity of the alleged 
secondary effects.
109
 Citing a police report performed in the county, the court noted that police 
responded to more alcohol-related incidents at establishments such as bars and restaurants as 
opposed to adult businesses.
110
 The court found that there was not enough evidence to support 
the county’s secondary effects argument.111  
The significance of these two cases should not be underestimated. By requiring a 
showing of convincing evidence that there actually exist harmful secondary effects adult 
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businesses can challenge the secondary effects doctrine. With that said, there is no indication that 
there needs to be either a good deal of evidence or a limit to the type of evidence that can be 
proffered. Therefore, municipalities may be able to justify regulations based on relatively low 
levels of evidence. Moreover, the scope of secondary effects may be defined broadly to 
encompass things like crime, property value, and aesthetics. As such, it is likely that 
municipalities will be able to justify their arguments. Lastly, while requiring a showing of actual 
adverse secondary effects, the courts still maintain that such evidence is a sufficient government 
interest to justify these laws. Thus, adult businesses are wholly reliant on challenging the 
evidence of secondary effects in order to successfully invalidate the laws. 
Recently, the secondary effects evidence that governments rely upon for their zoning laws 
have been called into question.
112
 A majority of the municipalities rely on a core group of 
secondary effects studies that appear flawed.
113
 In Alameda Books, the court was careful to point 
out that calling these studies into question.
114
 A government is afforded great power to 
unilaterally limit businesses simply by alleging a link between the relevant business and some 
associated negative effect. As such, careful attention should be paid to these studies as it has been 
shown that their legitimacy can be questionable.  
A recent law review article challenged the legitimacy of four secondary effects studies 
that many cities rely upon to show that adult businesses produce negative effects within the 
community.
115
 The studies were of St. Paul, Minnesota, Las Angeles, California, Phoenix, 
Arizona, and Indianapolis, Indiana respectively, as focused primarily on the methodology.
116
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After careful review, there remain serious concerns as to the weight these studies should be 
afforded as evidence in favor of furthering a substantial government interest. 
Each analysis yielded major flaws that attack the weight of the reasonableness of 
government’s reliance on these studies. The St. Paul study revealed that while there was a 
connection to neighborhood deterioration and establishments that served alcohol, there was not a 
connection between businesses that specialized in adult entertainment and neighborhood 
deterioration.
117
 The Las Angeles study was plagued with skewed evidence as the researchers 
either came to meekly supported conclusions or did not adhere to proper survey techniques.
118
 
The Phoenix study claimed to show a connection between neighborhood deterioration and adult 
businesses yet its control and study areas possessed vastly different income levels.
119
 Lastly, the 
article noted the following limitations to the Indianapolis study: (1) The control sites were not 
sufficiently comparable (properly matched) with the study sites, (2) No measurements were 
taken prior to the establishment of an adult entertainment business to ensure that the study was 
not merely picking up an already established crime pattern that is independent of the adult 
businesses in the area, (3) There was a potential confounding effect caused by adult 
entertainment businesses that supplied both sexually oriented entertainment and alcoholic 
beverages, (4) The researchers did not adhere to minimum professional standards by failing to 
conduct a survey study of real estate professionals in accordance with proper survey 
techniques.
120
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Time and place restrictions create a serious burden on businesses trying to operate on 
equal ground. One can easily envision how such laws can impede on the viability of a business 
trying to sell sex toys. Generally, businesses are treated equally as store owners are permitted to 
open in commercially zoned areas, regulate their own hours, and set their own prices. Time and 
place regulations generate barriers that can substantially limit an industry’s economic viability. A 
rule that restricts bars from staying open past eight o’clock makes its potential for profit low. 
Under such regulations, bars will be discouraged from opening, effectively eliminating drinking 
establishments. Likewise, zoning restrictions on adult businesses have equally troublesome 
results. Many zoning laws pertaining to adult businesses ensure that these establishments cannot 
open in residential areas and areas where children are present. While these laws may have a 
certain level of credibility on paper, in practice, they can effectively eliminate the sale of any 
product a government wishes. For instance, consider a zoning law that prohibits the sale of 
sexual devices within 200 feet of a park. Such a regulation may seem minimally intrusive, but in 
actuality, it can make it nearly impossible for a business of this sort to operate. For instance, a 
government intent on eliminate the sale of sex toys in a town can place a swing set on every 
piece of open land it can find and put a sign up labeling it a park. The government can contend 
that it is improving the aesthetics of the city, creating a family environment, and make other 
seemingly worthy arguments, but in reality, it may conveniently be pushing adult businesses out 
of the city. 
In the cases mentioned above, the targeted establishments involved either live or video 
performances of sexual nature and in some instances involved the sale of alcohol.                        
Moreover, the cases above generally involved cases where individuals convene for an extended 
period of time.  Stores that sell sex toys have arguably fewer characteristics that create 
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problematic secondary effects. A store that sells adult products is hardly unlike a store that sells 
kid’s toys. There is not a sale of secondary products like alcohol that inhibits one’s ability to 
make good decisions, potentially leading to criminal or unruly behavior. The sale of the products 
is no way physically harmful to a third party. The products can be concealed from people outside 
the store by prohibiting public display of the products and requiring that upon sale of the 
product, it must be placed in an opaque bag. Considering all these factors collectively, there are 
at the very least serious concerns as to the validity of a secondary effects argument.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Lawrence clearly articulated a right to sexual privacy. This right encompasses all sexual 
conduct that occurs within the privacy of one’s home. While governments have attempted 
prohibit the sale and distribution of sex toys, such action is impermissible. Just as prohibiting the 
sale of contraceptives infringes on one’s right to sexual privacy, so does a ban on the sale of sex 
toys. Unlike a commercial sale of sex like prostitution, the sale of sex toys is meant purely for 
private, personal use. Lawrence makes it clear that upholding a level of public morals is not 
sufficient to infringe on bedroom behavior, thus invalidating anti-sex toy statutes. Nevertheless, 
governments are armed with the secondary effects doctrine that can help them effectively ban 
these sales. While there may be instances where this interest in legitimate to uphold zoning laws 
harmful to adult businesses, the credibility of secondary effects evidence should be seriously 
questioned as this evidence is often misleading and contestable. As more individuals begin to 
question the evidential grounds for this type of legislation, it has become apparent that much of 
the information that has formed the basis for secondary effects legislation can be challenged. 
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Oftentimes, whether secondary effects legislation is valid is often directly related to the actual 
intent of the government electing to enact such laws. Furthermore, secondary effects arguments 
appear to be more effective against businesses that either show pornographic material or live 
nudity. Stores selling sex toys simply solicit business for goods that are used in one’s home. 
Ultimately, there should be little in terms of legal barriers that make it difficult for an individual 
to exercise his right to sexual privacy by purchasing a sex toy. 
 
